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Extending recent theoretical contributions on sources of inflation inertia, we argue that 
monetary uncertainty accounts for sluggish expectations adjustment to nominal disturbances. 
Estimating a model in which rational individuals learn over time about shifts in U.S. 
monetary policy and the Phillips curve, we find strong evidence that this link exists. These 
results question the standard approach for evaluating monetary rules by assuming unchanged 
private sector responses, help clarify the role of monetary stability in reducing output 
variability in the U.S. and elsewhere, and tell a subtle and dynamic story of the interaction 
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“Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of 
economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the 
structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will 
systematically alter the structure of econometric models” 
(Lucas, 1976 p.41) 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
One of the most striking economic developments of recent decades has been the 
success in restoring low inflation in the United States and elsewhere. While this success was 
aided by a variety of factors—including more prudent fiscal policies, structural reforms, and 
declining oil and commodity prices—there is a large consensus that changes in monetary 
policy have played a central role.
1 Estimated monetary policy rules suggest that through 
much of the 1970s the Federal Reserve pursued a policy that accommodated inflationary 
shocks in the United States, leading to instability in the economy as real rates responded 
perversely to inflationary disturbances.
2 This practice ended with Paul Volker’s appointment 
as Chairman in 1979, when the policy response to expected inflation became “sufficiently” 
strong and monetary stability was thereby restored. 
 
                                                 
1 This largely reflected the recognition by the public and politicians that high inflation was 
associated with bad economic performance, as well as the recognition by central bankers that 
policies aimed at systematically exploiting the short-run output/inflation tradeoff to increase 
output beyond potential were ineffective and self-defeating (Viñals, 2001), based on the 
model of Barro and Gordon (1983). 
2 See Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998, 2000). Christiano and Gust (2000) 
emphasize that a high inflation expectations trap may arise if policy accommodates inflation 
as suggested by empirical estimates of the U.S. monetary policy reaction function. On the 
other hand, Orphanides (1998, 2000), Orphanides and Williams (2002), and 
McCallum (2001) argue the policy error was more related to an overemphasis on flawed 
estimates of the output gap.   - 4 - 
This paper reexamines the experience with disinflation since the 1970s focusing on 
the interaction between monetary policy and supply-side responses of the private sector. 
Recent theoretical papers have concluded that imperfect information about the future path of 
monetary aggregates can directly affect the speed of response of aggregate supply in models 
in which inflation inertia is the result of noisy signals about the future path of nominal 
aggregate demand (Mankiw and Reis, 2001, Woodford, 2003, Amato and Shin, 2003, based 
on the original insights provided by Lucas, 1979, and Phelps, 1983). We extend this model 
by linking the uncertainty about aggregate demand to instability in monetary policy. Because 
the real interest rate is an important driver of spending, this extension provides a clear 
potential link between the conduct of monetary policy and the degree of inertia in supply-side 
response. To capture the dynamics of this relationship, we estimate how individuals’ 
perceptions of the Phillips curve (i.e., the supply function) and the monetary reaction 
function have evolved since the early 1970s employing Kalman filters for the learning 
process, and then use these results to examine the link between monetary stability and 
inflationary persistence. 
 
Anticipating our conclusions, we find strong evidence that reductions in uncertainty 
about the path of the real interest rate do indeed produce a gradual reduction of the nominal 
inertia in the Phillips curve. This link helps to explain the role of the Federal Reserve in some 
of the recent improvements in supply-side responses of the U.S. economy, such as the fall in 
output volatility over recent years and the widespread belief that the costs of reducing   - 5 - 
inflation have also fallen.
3 In doing so, we question what might be termed the central dogma 
of modern monetary economics;
4 namely the belief that changes in monetary policies affect 
only the aggregate demand side of the economy.
5 This assumption has generated an extensive 
literature on evaluation the outcomes and robustness of alternative monetary rules.
6 While 
such an approach can be useful in evaluating minor changes in policy or short-term 
responses, our results indicate it may be seriously flawed for longer-term analysis. We would 
also note that although we focus on U.S. data, the increase in transparency and predictability 
of central bankers’ behavior has been a general phenomena across countries, as has been the 
fall in inflationary persistence.
7 Hence, our analysis has implications across a wide range of 
countries. 
 
While we are unaware of any other empirical work using the theoretical link we 
make, our theoretical framework can be related to a number of earlier contributions. Erceg 
and Levin (2003) simulate a calibrated micro-founded model with staggered contracts to 
                                                 
3 See Blanchard and Simon (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2002), and Stock and Watson 
(2003) on the fall of output variability in the United States since the 1980s. 
4 The phrase “central dogma” was coined by Francis Crick in biology to describe the 
assumption that DNA affected RNA but not vice versa. This assumption was a useful first 
approximation, although it has subsequently become clear that RNA can indeed affect DNA. 
5 There is little controversy that changes in monetary policy can affect supply responses in 
extreme cases, such as at the end of hyper-inflations (Sargent, 1993) or over the great 
depression (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). 
6 See, for example, the book edited by Taylor (1999), and the comprehensive survey in 
Walsh (1998). 
7 See Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) on monetary policies and IMF (2002) for a more 
general overview. 
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suggest that realistic changes in inflation persistence can be generated by agents’ inability to 
disentangle permanent from transitory shifts in the policy target of the central bank’s reaction 
function (see also Gertler, 1982). On the empirical side, Cogley and Sargent (2001), using a 
non-linear Bayesian VAR with time-varying coefficients, provide evidence on the positive 
correlation between inflation inertia and the monetary authority’s evolving view about the 
economy, but do not link the two in any systematic manner
8. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the analytical 
framework for analyzing the mechanism through which shifts in monetary policy 
predictability alter the nature of the inflation process. In Section III, we present estimates for 
the United States of the changing parameters of the model and provide evidence of the long-
run relationship linking monetary policy uncertainty to inflation persistence. In the last 
section, we summarize the findings and discuss policy implications. 
 
II.   THE MODEL 
A.   Theory 
 Modern monetary models of business fluctuations are generally derived  within a 
New-Keynesian framework allowing for price stickiness through staggered timing of price 
adjustment (Taylor, 1980; Calvo, 1983) or via quadratic costs of price adjustment 
                                                 
8 A Bayesian VAR model of U.S. monetary policy allowing for discrete regime shifts is also 
used in Sims (1999). For a structural time-varying-parameter model see, for instance, the 
seminal contribution by Kim and Nelson (1989).   - 7 - 
(Rotemberg, 1996). Assuming full information and rational expectations, such pricing 
models give rise to an aggregate supply relation of the form: 
 
( )
π ε γ π β π t t t t t t y y E + − + Ω =
∗
+ ) ( 1          ( 1 )  
 
where  t π is the quarterly change in the log of consumer prices, ( ) t t y y
∗ −  are the deviations 
of log of real GDP from its flexible-price level, and 
π εt  is a supply shock assumed to be 
white noise. E is the mathematical expectation operator ,  t Ω  is the full information set 
available in the economy at time t, b  is the discount factor, andγ  is a parameter measuring 
the degree of real rigidities. 
 
On empirical grounds, this aggregate supply model fails to generate realistic degrees 
of inflation persistence and disinflation costs (Ball, 1994; Roberts, 1998, 2001). To account 
for more sluggish expectations adjustment to nominal shocks, equation (1) needs to be 
augmented with a backward looking element involving past inflation: 
 
( )
π ε γ π β λ λπ π t t t t t t t y y E + − + Ω − + =
∗
+ − ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1        ( 1′) 
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Although such Phillips curves are standard in the empirical literature (Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler, 1999; King and Wolman, 1999; Levin, Wieland and Williams, 1999), the theoretical 
justification for these additional lags has been a source of contention. 
9 
 
In addition, an empirical conundrum with such models is that the disinflation of the 
1980s and 1990s was accompanied by an increase in the coefficient on forward-looking 
inflationary expectations—in other words, a fall in inflationary persistence.
10 It is difficult to 
see why a reduction in inflation and inflationary uncertainty would be accompanied by lower 
persistence in a model relying only on staggered contracts or menu costs to explain nominal 
inertia. Lower and more stable inflation would seem to be a force for lengthening contracts, 
implying greater persistence in inflation. Similarly, costs of adjustment would be lower as 
inflation is reduced and stabilized, again implying greater inflationary persistence. 
 
Fortunately, recent advances in theory produce a motivation for inflation inertia 
through another mechanism, namely imperfect information about the future path of nominal 
aggregate demand. As discussed in Woodford (2003), Amato and Shin (2003), and Mankiw 
and Reis (2001), and building on original insights by Lucas (1972) and Phelps (1983), 
persistent real effects of nominal shocks can also be generated in a model that assumes that 
                                                 
9 Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995) argue that there is a structural 
interpretation using overlapping relative real wage contracts. Alternative approaches have 
assumed imperfect credibility of monetary authority’s announcements (Ball, 1995) or that 
some agents use simple autoregressive rules of thumb to forecast inflation instead of 
perfectly rational expectations (Roberts, 1998; Ball, 2000; Ireland, 2000). Departures from an 
optimizing-agent framework are, however, unpalatable to some involved in the 
microfoundation approach to macroeconomics (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997 and 1999). 
10 Erceg and Levin (2003) make the same point.   - 9 - 
fully rational individuals have only access to noisy information about the state of nominal 
aggregate demand. More specifically, it is assumed that each individual receives a different 
and imperfect signal about changes in aggregate demand conditions. The uncertainty 
associated with this signal makes inflation expectations adjust only sluggishly to nominal 
disturbances even when rationally interpreted by economic agents, an effect which for 




The crucial implication of such theoretical models (at least for this paper) is that they 
are able to explain why and how the degree of inflation inertia varies over time. Specifically, 
pricing models embedding imperfect information imply that the coefficient on lagged 
inflation (λ) rises as uncertainty about the signal rises relative to uncertainty from other 
sources—the signal to noise ratio. The resulting Phillips curve (1′) can thus be rewritten as: 
 
( )
π ε γ π κ λ π κ λ π t t t t t t t t t y y E + − + Ω − + =
∗
+ − ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( 1 1      ( 1′′) 
 
                                                 
11 Erceg and Levin (2003) provide a model suggesting that combining a staggered contracts 
model with information uncertainty can generate a Phillips curve in inflation of the type of 
equation (1’), although the microeconomics of this have yet to be fully analyzed. The link 
between inflation persistence and learning about regime shifts in the parameters of a 
monetary reaction function has been analyzed econometrically using stochastic simulations 
by Fuhrer and Hooker (1993). 
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where κt represents the portion of the overall uncertainty about the state of demand that is due 
to uncertainty in predicting the signal, while we have simplified the equation by assuming 
that β=1 to ensure money superneutrality. 
 
  As the interest rate stance is an important factor in determining aggregate demand, it 
follows that uncertainty about the evolution of interest rate policy translates into uncertainty 
about the path of aggregate demand. To illustrate this link, let us posit an extremely simple 
aggregate demand relationship in which the output gap depends linearly on uncorrelated 
demand shocks and on deviations of the current short-term real interest rate from its 
equilibrium real rate (alternative time-invariant specifications can also be considered, but add 




tt t t yy rr φ ε
∗ −=− +           ( 2 )  
 
where ( ) t t y y
∗ −  is the output gap as defined above, ( )
*
t rr − represents deviations of the ex-
ante short-term real interest rate from the natural rate, φ <0 denotes real interest rate semi-
elasticity, and ε
D
t indicates a random disturbance which is assumed to have a fixed variance 
2
D ε σ . (Note that this equation can be rewritten substituting nominal for real aggregate demand 
and the nominal interest rate for the real one).  
 
We will assume that at the beginning of each period t individuals form an opinion on 
the likely state of aggregate demand conditions based on their inference of the real interest 
rate (the signal), conditional upon available information up to time t-1. If recent imperfect   - 11 - 
information models are a good description of reality, it follows that the coefficient on lagged 
inflation in the Phillips curve (1’) should be positively related to uncertainty about the 
evolution of the real interest rate relative to overall uncertainty in aggregate demand (the 
signal-to-noise ratio or Kalman gain). In this case, the fraction of the overall (conditional) 



















.         ( 3 )  
 
In order to obtain an estimate of the uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the real 
interest rate, we need to describe how individuals form their opinion on the likely monetary 
policy stance. To do that, we model the short-term real interest rate using a monetary reaction 
function. Such functions generally start from a Taylor rule in which deviations of the desired 
real interest rate from equilibrium( )
* rr −  depend on the deviations of inflation from its 
desired level (
*
t π ) and the estimated output gap (Taylor, 1989): 
 
() ( ) ( )
**
12 rr yy δπ π δ
∗ −= − + −         ( 4 )  
 
To take account of interest rate smoothing, we use the standard approach of incorporating a 
partial adjustment mechanism in which the change in the interest rate depends upon the gap   - 12 - 
between the actual and desired rate (see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000).
12 This generates 
the following equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ()
**
11 1 1 2 1 1 (1 )
r
tt t t t t t rr r y y ρ ρδ π π δ ε
∗
−− − − − =+ −+− +− +      (5) 
 
where  ttt ri π =− , the ex post real interest rate, ρ is the smoothing parameter, and 
r
t ε  is a 
monetary policy shock. A feature of equation (5) is that the current level of the real interest 
rate depends only on past variables. The advantage of this specification, which is a standard 
feature of models incorporating learning through signal extraction (see, for example, Erceg 
and Levin, 2003, and Cogley and Sargent, 1999), is that the future real interest rate is a 
function of predetermined variables, so that the variance of the real rate depends only on 
uncertainty about the parameters and policy shocks. Allowing for forward-looking variables 
in this model complicates the analysis as the uncertainty around projecting these variables 
becomes an additional issue in calculating the conditional variance of the real interest rate.
 13 
 
B.   Estimation Strategy 
  We wish to estimate the Phillips curve and monetary reaction function in a manner 
that incorporates a realistic model of optimal learning over time and allows for the estimation 
                                                 
12 These models generally focus on the nominal interest rate. We focus on the real rate as it 
seems the most relevant variable given our theoretical structure. 
13 It should be stressed that we are not proxing here monetary policy conduct with a myopic 
reaction function. Rather, we are assuming that, at each period t, rational agents revise their 
inference about the monetary stance, conditional upon Fed’s observed behavior at time t-1.   - 13 - 
of the conditional variance of the expected real interest rate, that is the uncertainty associated 
with the prediction of the signal. The obvious method for accomplishing this is to use 
Kalman filter techniques, in which rational individuals update their estimates (as well as the 
variances associated to these estimates) in a Bayesian fashion. 
 
  More specifically, at each period t we obtain basic filter estimates of two independent 
measurement equations, conditional upon information available up to time t-1: 
 
() 1 ttt t t t t t yy
π π ηλ π γ ε
∗
− =+ + − +        ( 1′′′ ) 
11 12 1 1 ()
r
ttt t t t t t t t rr y y µ ρϕ π ϕ ε
∗
−− − − =+ + + − +       ( 5′) 
 
where the subscripts t on the parameters η, µ, λ, γ, ρ, φ1, and φ2 reflect the fact that they are 
assumed to vary over time, following independent random walk processes.
14 Hence, the 
transition equation describing the dynamics of the parameters of the Phillips curve (1′′′ ) will 
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,          ( 6 )  
 
                                                 
14 By construction, the error terms of the two equations are assumed to be orthogonal and 
uncorrelated with the set of regressors.   - 14 - 
with 
2
, ~. .. ( 0 , ) it i iidN υ σ for i=1,2,3, and  , () 0 ti s E
π ευ =  for all t and s, and for i=1,2,3. 
Similarly, the transition equation associated to the parameters of the monetary rule (5′) can 
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, ~. .. ( 0 , ) it i iidN ν σ for i=1,...,4, and  , () 0 ti s E
π εν =  for all t and s, and for i=1,...,4. 
 
Note that the deep parameters in the original equations (1′′) and (5) can be recovered 
from the linear estimating equations (1′′′ ) and (5′). In the Phillips curve, for example, as ηt = 
(1-λt) Etπt+1, and λt is estimated directly in the equation, we can infer the value of the time-
varying unobserved component Etπt+1. Similarly, the long-run coefficients on the monetary 
reaction function (δ1t and δ2t) can be derived from ρt, φ1t, and φ2t. Finally, given an exogenous 
assumption about the time-invariant natural rate of interest, the unobservable and time-
varying desired level of inflation ( *
t π ) can be inferred from the intercept, µt.
15 
 
                                                 
15 To keep the lags in the Phillips curve short, the rate of inflation in eqaution (1′′ ) is 
measured using the annualized rate of quarterly CPI inflation. In the monetary policy rule, 
where the focus is on underlying infaltionary trends, the annual rate of CPI inflation is used.   - 15 - 
A key parameter in the theoretical model is the conditional variance of next period’s 
real interest rate. Rewriting the monetary reaction function in the generic form 
r
tt t t rX β ε =+ , 




|1 , () r
tt t rt t t t XX
ε σ βσ
− − ′ =Σ +
   (8) 
 
where  |1 () tt t β − Σ is the conditional covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients. The 
conditional variance of rt can thus be decomposed into two components: the uncertainty 
coming from changes in the coefficients of the monetary rule and the uncertainty due to 
unexpected deviations from such a rule, a partition that will prove informative below. 
 
On the presumption that uncertainty about the state of both real interest rate and 
inflation arises not only from a changing structure of the economy, but also from shifts in the 
volatility of external shocks 
r
t ε  and  t
π ε , we also assume that disturbances on both equations 




for example, it follows that: 
 
                                                 
16 For the linearization involved, see Harvey, Ruiz, and Sentana (1992). An alternative 
approach to account for regime shifts in the variance of random shocks would be to consider 
a time-varying coefficients monetary reaction function with Markov-switching 
heteroskedasticity in the disturbance term. See, for instance, Kim (1993), Sims (1999). The 
major difference between ARCH-type and Markov-switching heteroskedasticity is that 
whereas the unconditional variance of the forecast error is constant in the former, in the latter 
it is subject to shifts due to endogenous regime breaks.   - 16 - 
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          ( 9 )  
 
The crucial step in testing our model is to examine whether the expected relationship 
between the coefficient on past inflation in the Phillips curve (λt) and the signal-to-noise ratio 
discussed above ( t κ ) holds, at least over the long run. We accomplish this by testing for the 
existence of a linear cointegrating relationship such as: 
 
01 tt λ χχ κ =+                             (10) 
 
and examining whether the coefficient  1 χ  is positive and statistically significant, and 
whether changes in monetary policy uncertainty lead to changes in supply-side behavior 
rather than vice versa.
17,18 
 
                                                 
17 While we do not estimate an aggregate demand function, for empirical purposes we 
implicitly assume equation (2) to hold with a unit interest rate semi-elasticity and a standard 

















.            ( 3 ’ )  
Note that both the sign and the significance of  1 χ  in (10) are unaffected by these 
assumptions. 
18 While the assumption of non-stationarity of the signal-to-noise ratio is conceptually 
questionable, the corresponding time series  t κ  is found statistically indistinguishable from a 
I(1) process over the finite sample considered.   - 17 - 
III.   RESULTS 
 
The model described by the two independent equations (1′′′ ) and (5′) was estimated 
using quarterly data starting in the first quarter of 1961. The Kalman filters are started in 
early 1967, with initial values for the variances of the coefficients being based on OLS 




The output gap cannot be observed directly. This is an important issue in empirical 
models of monetary policy, as assumptions about the gap can matter, with some authors 
arguing that conventional measures underplay the role of over-reliance on inaccurate 
estimates of the output gap in the rise in inflation in the 1970s, and that “real time” data on 
the output gap (i.e. data available to policy makers at the time) paints a more convincing 
picture of the evolution of monetary policy.
20 To investigate the role of different approaches 
to the output gap in the analysis, three different output gap measures were used: (a) estimates 
of the trend and cyclical components of the log of real GDP using Kalman filters, so that 
                                                 
19 Computation has been carried out in Gauss 5.0, by appropriate modication of Kim and 
Nelson’s (1999) routines publicly available on the website 
http://www.econ.washington.edu/user/cnelson/SSMARKOV.htm. 
20 Orphanides (1998). See also Smets (1999), McCallum (2001), and Walsh (2003).   - 18 - 
permanent shifts in potential output,  t y
∗ , are decomposed from shocks to the transitory 
component of real output, the output gap ( ) tt yy



























        ( 1 1 )  
 
(b) a conventional Hodrick-Prescott filter; and (c) “real time” output gap data up to 1995, 




Detailed results of Kalman filter estimation of potential output are provided in Table 
1.
23 The estimated drift (g) indicates that potential output increased at a rate of around ¾ 
percent per quarter on average over the period (3 percent per annum), whereas inference of 
the  autocorrelation coefficient on the output gap (θ) points to highly persistent deviations 
from this trend. Not surprisingly, the relative magnitude of equations’ standard errors shows 
                                                 
21 The unobserved components are identified as in Nelson and Plosser (1982) by assuming 
that their shocks, 
* y
t ε and 
y
t ε
 , are mutually independent random errors with zero mean and 
constant variance. 
22 We are grateful to Athanasios Orphanides, who kindly provided these data to us. 
23 Estimates of trend and cyclical component of real output are obtained separately from the 
other equations. In this way, all three output gap measures are policy invariant and results 
are, thus, comparable.   - 19 - 
that a significant portion of the quarter-to-quarter innovations in real GDP are cyclical and 
not permanent. 
 
The path of the three series for the output gap and their autocorrelations are reported 
in Figure 1. The autocorrelation functions indicate that the alternative measures have 
somewhat different characteristics, with the Hodrick-Prescott filter exhibiting the lowest 
degree of correlation over time, followed by the Kalman filter, and the “real time” data 
exhibiting the most inertia, reflecting the large and highly serially correlated gaps in the 
1970s. Given the size of these differences, and the controversy over the correct approach to 
measuring the output gap, we report results using all three approaches, denoted by KL_ 
(Kalman filter), HP_ (Hodrick-Prescott Filter), and ORP_ (Orphanides’s real time data). 
 
The estimates of the Phillips curve suggest some striking changes in private sector 
behavior since 1970, particularly as regards the role of past and expected future inflation. 
Table 2 reports the estimated standard errors on the estimated coefficients of the Phillips 
curve, while Figure 2 records the corresponding basic filters, with the top panel showing the 
the time-varying coefficient on lagged inflation,  t λ , one of the central parameters in our 
model. This coefficient rises rapidly over the early 1970s, from under one-quarter to around 
three-quarters, continues at this value to the late 1970s before gradually declining through 
1990 and then stabilizing again below 0.5. Such a pattern fits closely with conventional view 
that monetary credibility was lost rapidly in the mid-1970s and regained slowly starting in 
the early 1980s (a story that our own estimated monetary reaction function confirms). It fits 
less well to other potential explanations of changes in the inertia in the Phillips curve. For   - 20 - 
example, while deregulation of the U.S. economy over the 1980s and 1990s might help to 
explain the gradual decrease in nominal inertia, the rapid increase in the early 1970s appears 
difficult to explain using a slow moving factor such as the macroeconomic impact of 
structural policies. 
 
The coefficient on the output gap,  t γ , reported in the middle panel, moves much less 
dramatically over time. It shows a similar pattern to that on past inflation, plausibly reflecting 
the fact that prices respond more vigorously to activity if monetary policy is more 
accommodative. Prices are estimated to have become more sensitive to movements in the 
output gap through the 1970s and less sensitive subsequently, although in the pattern after 
about 1982 depends somewhat on the data used to measure the output gap. 
 
Three other features of these coefficient estimates are worth emphasizing. First, the 
estimated coefficients on both past inflation and the output gap have broadly similar values at 
the start and end of the period. The overall impression is of a process which is knocked out of 
kilter in the mid-1970s and then gradually regained its initial equilibrium subsequently. In a 
sense, we have returned to a similar level of stability as that seen at the end of the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate period. Second, the Orphanides data tend to imply larger movements in 
coefficients over the intervening period of monetary policy instability. For example, using 
Orphanides data, inflation dynamics approximate a unit-root process over the mid-1970s, 
while in the other two data sets the coefficient on lagged inflation is high but below unity. 
Third, despite some differences in details, different measures of the output gap tend to show 
a similar overall picture about changes in behavior over time.    - 21 - 
 
All of these features are evident in the implied series for unobserved expected 
inflation,  1 () tt E π + Ω , shown in the bottom panel of the Figure. Rational expectations of 
inflation start at around 5 percent in 1970s, rise to double digit values in the mid- to late 
1970s (and much higher in the Orphanides data) before falling to the low single digits by the 
late 1980s. 
 
Turning to the estimated GARCH process for supply disturbances, coefficient 
estimates reported in Table 3 indicate a process with considerable variation over time. The 
average coefficient on the square of the current residual is around one-quarter and that on the 
lagged estimate of the variance three-quarters, suggesting a half life of only one year, while 
the standard deviations on both terms are over one-tenth, suggesting that this process has also 
shifted considerably over time. These features are illustrated in Figure 3, which graphs 
conditional variance of inflation and decomposes it into the influence from the changing 
volatility in the residuals (the GARCH process) and uncertainty surrounding the coefficient 
estimates. The results associated with the three measures of the output gap series appear 
almost identical. The conditional variance lags actual inflation, peaking in the 1980s, during 
the process of deflation, rather than the inflationary burst of the late 1970s. These trends are 
dominated by changes in the estimated variance of the residuals, which accounts for over 
three-quarters of the total variance in inflation. However, the uncertainty in coefficients also 
plays a role, particularly around the response to the supply shocks in the mid-1970s and the 
early period of the Volker disinflation in the early 1980s, when it explains about half of 
uncertainty in inflation.   - 22 - 
 
The estimated coefficients on the Federal Reserve’s reaction function also show large 
changes over time corresponding to the conventional wisdom about the path of monetary 
policy, as well as providing some additional insights. Table 4 reports the estimated standard 
errors on the coefficients. In Figure 4, the upper left and right panels graph the long-run 
coefficients on inflation and the output gap, respectively, whereas the bottom panels report 
the implied desired level of inflation on the left, and the estimated smoothing parameter on 
the right. The coefficient on inflation illustrates the loss in monetary stability in the late-
’seventies. This coefficient needs to be positive to imply monetary stability, but falls well 
below this threshold using the Kalman filter or Hodrick-Prescott filter. Interestingly, the 
reaction function using the Orphanides data stays (barely) stable, supporting his view that 
real time data provide a more plausible picture of the Fed’s behavior.
24 This is followed by a 
clear change in behavior after Paul Volker became chairman, with the coefficient on inflation 
rising rapidly to about unity by the mid-1980s. The coefficient subsequently falls to a value 
of around one-half in the late 1990s, with a blip down in the early 1990s when the rule 
appears close to unstable. Cogley and Sargent (1999) found a similar result, and plausibly 
attribute it to the policy of “opportunistic disinflation” adopted at the time. Certainly, such an 
intrinsically asymmetric policy rule could be difficult to capture in a linear model like ours. 
Interestingly, the instability is again less pronounced using the real time data for the output 
gap, suggesting that this may also matter. Finally, there is a decline in the coefficient at the 
                                                 
24 Orphanides himself emphasizes that it is also important to use real time data on 
inflationary expectations in the monetary policy reaction function (Orphanides, 1998). Our 
reaction function uses past information, but we discuss this point in detail in a companion 
paper (Bayoumi and Sgherri, 2003).   - 23 - 
end of the sample period, possibly reflecting a rising concern about the possibility of 
deflation as the U.S. economy fell into recession, leading to a renewed focus on output rather 
than inflation. 
 
Movements in the coefficient on the output gap tend to mirror those of the coefficient 
on inflation with an opposite sign. The coefficient is relatively stable through the 1970s 
before falling (and even becoming negative) early in the early 1980s, reflecting chairman 
Volker’s focus on wringing inflation out of the system. It subsequently returns to the level of 
the 1970s (except for a temporary dip at the height of the late 1990s/early 2000 boom). The 
derived estimates of the unobservable steady state inflation are relatively stable around two 
percent (assuming a natural real interest rate of 4 percent), again falling somewhat during the 
deflation of the 1980s. Finally, estimates of the smoothing parameter show a fall over the 
1970s followed by a steady rise over the 1980s and 1990s before falling recently, when the 
zero bound may have limited the Fed’s room to maneuver. 
 
These coefficient estimates tell the conventional story of a loss of monetary control 
followed by a strong disinflation, but with a number of interesting twists. One is the 
relatively similarity of the long-term responses to inflation and output between the early 
1970s and more recently. This implies significantly more stability in the underlying rule 
between the end of the Bretton Woods period and the 1990s (both characterized by monetary 
stability) than has generally been recognized. A second interesting feature is the increase in 
the smoothing parameter between these two periods. Greater smoothing of interest rates 
places greater reliance on the expectations channel of policy, wherein individuals respond to   - 24 - 
expectations of future changes in policy rather than to those that are actually taking place. As 
the public has regained confidence in policy and become more forward-looking, the Fed 
appears to have responded by making monetary policy responses more gradual. Hence, 
changes in private sector behavior appear to have also affected the responses of the Federal 
Reserve. This is a considerably more subtle interaction between monetary policy and private 
sector behavior than is generally acknowledged in simple pre- and post-Volker 
characterization of monetary policy (this issue is discussed further in Bayoumi and Sgherri, 
2003). 
 
Turning to the uncertainty associated with unexpected deviations from the described 
monetary policy rule, a key variable in our analysis, coefficient estimates show no significant 
evidence of GARCH heteroscedasticity in the disturbances to the real interest rate, even 
though the results differ somewhat depending on the measure of the output gap being used 
(Table 5). This implies that essentially all of the uncertainty about policy actions comes from 
uncertainty about the underlying parameters in the rule, with virtually no contribution from 
unexpected deviations from this rule, as clearly visualized in Figure 5. Put differently, 
uncertainty about the path of interest rates comes from an inability to discern what the 
underlying monetary rule is, rather than from the belief that the Federal Reserve’s actions are 
in some manner random—an eminently sensible result, and completely different from the 
results for the Phillips curve. Consequently, monetary uncertainty is at its highest during 
periods when the monetary rule appears to have changed rapidly, such as the mid-1970s and 
early 1980s, and has fallen to extremely low levels in the 1990s as the rule has stabilized and 
changes in interest rates have become smoother.   - 25 - 
 
The final step in our analysis is to examine the dynamic relationship between our 
proxy for inflation persistence (the coefficient on backward-looking expectations in the 
Phillips curve, t λ ) and our proxy for the portion of uncertainty about aggregate demand due 
to uncertainty about the monetary policy stance (the signal-to-noise ratio,  t κ , as defined in 
(3’)). For each output gap measure used, Figure 6 illustrates the general co-movement of 
these estimated time series, with the thick line showing our measure of policy uncertainty 
and the thin line the coefficient on forward-looking inflation in the Phillips curve. More 
formally, the analysis was accomplished by testing for a cointegrating relationship since 
1970s in a vector autoregression model with two lags.
25 Results are reported in Table 6. As 
can be seen in the upper panel of the Table, trace-tests indicate the existence of a 
cointegration using Hodrick-Prescott and Kalman filter measures of the output gap, while no 
concluding evidence is provided when using real-time data. The middle panel reports the 
coefficient estimates on this long-run relationship and the estimated error correction 
coefficients in the VAR, while providing strong support to the hypothesis of weak exogeneity 
of monetary policy uncertainty in the relationship describing the evolution of nominal 
persistence. The coefficient on the cointegrating relationship is correctly signed and 
insignificantly different from unity (not shown), while the speed of mean reversion is quite 
low, with the error correction terms implying lags of the order of 5 years. This slow process 
of adjustment is consistent with the common wisdom that it is not easy to lose credibility but 
that, once lost, it is difficult to regain the public’s confidence. It also helps explain why the 
                                                 
25 Residual analysis shows no evidence of significant mis-specification. Results are available 
upon request.   - 26 - 
disinflation of the 1980s is generally regarded as involving large costs in terms output (Ball, 
1994, and Roberts, 1998). Finally, as reported in the lower panel, Granger causality tests 
indicate that monetary policy uncertainty Granger causes persistence, but there is no 
feedback in the other direction. These supplemental results strengthen our belief that, over 
the sample period under analysis, inflation inertia has fallen because (not simply “as”) 
monetary policy transparency has increased. 
 
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper questions the conventional wisdom that monetary policy has no impact on 
the supply-side of the economy. Extending recent theoretical insights using models with 
strong micro-economic foundations, we propose the existence of a link between monetary 
policy uncertainty and the degree of inflation inertia in the Phillips curve. An empirical 
model was first estimated using Kalman filters to chart shifts over time in the monetary 
policy reaction function and the Phillips curve, and the results used to examine the empirical 
validity of this hypothesized link between uncertainty about the monetary stance and 
inflation persistence. We find strong evidence that such a connection exists. More precisely, 
there is a close, statistically significant, long-term link between changes in the portion of 
uncertainty about aggregate demand that is due uncertainty in predicting the real interest rate 
and the coefficient on inflation inertia in the Phillips curve, with no evidence of reverse 
causation. In other words, a more stable monetary policy appears to gradually make the 
supply response less sluggish, exactly as predicted by theory. 
   - 27 - 
Linking monetary policy and supply responses has a number of important 
implications. First, it calls into question the large body of work that assesses monetary rules 
by assuming that such rules has no impact on underlying private sector behavior. While such 
analysis may be useful for the short-term impact of changes in monetary rules, the analysis in 
this paper suggests that it is fraught with difficulty as a guide to the longer-term 
consequences of a policy shift. Second, the inertia associated with the public first learning 
about the new policy rule and then incorporating it into their supply-side responses helps 
explain why the disinflation of the 1980s was so difficult. Third, it implies that there is a 
direct connection between some of the more recent improvements in the U.S. economy, such 
as the fall in output volatility, and the conduct of monetary policy. If a more stable monetary 
policy eventually makes the inflationary response of the economy less backward-looking, 
this reduction in inflation inertia can make the entire supply side of the economy more 
efficient, reducing output fluctuations. In short, it appears that some of the seemingly magical 
improvements in the supply side of the U.S. economy since the early 1970s can be attributed 
to Federal Reserve behavior. At the same time, increases in monetary stability and reductions 
in the variance of output are general phenomena across a wide range of countries, suggesting 
that this analysis has wider implications than the United States. 
 
Our results are also able to generate a more subtle interpretation of recent monetary 
history than the simple, pre- and post-Volker characterization that is often emphasized. While 
agreeing that the loss of monetary control in the mid-1970s and focus on reducing inflation 
attendant with the elevation of Paul Volker to chairman of the Federal Reserve, are key 
events, we also find a surprising degree of similarity between the rules followed in the early   - 28 - 
1970s and late 1990s, both periods of relative monetary stability. The one important 
difference we find, that there is more interest rate smoothing in the 1990s, is also 
informative. It suggests that the Federal Reserve has put increasing focus on the expectations 
channel of monetary policy. We interpret this as illustrating the dynamic relationship 
between monetary policy and the private sector. The disinflation triggered by Chairman 
Volker’s policies increased public confidence in monetary policy, reducing inertia in the 
inflation process. This, in turn, made the expectations channel more effective. In response, 
the Federal Reserve under Chairman Greenspan responded to this opportunity by making its 
own policies more gradualist and less disruptive. In summary, in addition to the private 
sector behavior responding to changes in monetary policy, monetary policy makers also 
appear to have responded to shifts in private sector behavior.   - 29 - 
Table 1. Estimates of the Time-Varying Parameters of U.S. Output Gap (1966:1–2002:1) 
 
Parameters  Model 1 (Kalman Filter) 
s y ~   0.0085 (0.0005) 
sy*  0.0009 (0.0020) 
q  0.9229 (0.0212) 
g  0.0074 (0.0002) 
Log likelihood  484.6667 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparing Time-Series Properties of Alternative Output Gap Measures 
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Table 2. Estimates of the Time-Varying Parameters of U.S. Phillips Curve (1967:2–2002:1) 
 
Parameters  Model 1 (Kalman Filter)  Model 2 (HP Filter)  Model 3 (Real-time data) 
sh  0.0000 (0.1039) 0.0000 (0.1043)  0.2580 (0.2140) 
sλ  0.0497 (0.0166) 0.0397 (0.0170)  0.0413 (0.0167) 
sg  0.0000 (0.0159) 0.0000 (0.0267)  0.0000 (0.0254) 
 
 
Figure 2. Kalman-Filter Estimates of the Time-Varying Regression Coefficients 
of U.S. Phillips Curve 
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Table 3. Estimates of the GARCH Process Characterizing Disturbances to the Phillips Curve 
 
α0  0.0881 (0.0633) 0.0709 (0.0594)  0.0600 (0.0502) 
α1  0.1999 (0.0916) 0.2424 (0.1109)  0.3126 (0.1344) 
α2  0.7696 (0.0924) 0.7472 (0.1024)  0.6839 (0.1312) 
 
 
Figure 3. Decomposition of Inflation Conditional Variance 
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Table 4. Estimates of the Time-Varying Parameters of U.S. Monetary Rule     
(1967:2–2002:1) 
Parameters  Model 1 (Kalman Filter)  Model 2 (HP Filter)  Model 3 (Real-time data) 
sµ  0.4321 (0.2510) 0.4199 (0.3598)  0.3708 (0.2456) 
sρ  0.0371 (0.0187) 0.0446 (0.0312)  0.0266 (0.0173) 
sϕ1  0.1251 (0.0158) 0.0576 (0.0373)  0.0374 (0.0213) 




Figure 4. Kalman-Filter Estimates of the Time-Varying Regression Coefficients 
of U.S. Monetary Rule 
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Table 5. Estimates of the GARCH Process Characterizing Disturbances to the Monetary Rule 
 
a0  0.0016 (0.0092) 0.0008 (0.0006)  0.0024 (0.0332) 
a1  0.1554 (0.7836) 0.2445 (1.6649)  0.0000 (0.0002) 
a2  0.3848 (0.3699) 0.5319 (2.9470)  0.8452 (2.1045) 
 
Figure 5. Decomposition of Real Interest Rate Conditional Variance 
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Figure 6. Time-Varying Estimates of Inflation Persistence and Relative Uncertainty  
  About Monetary Policy Based on Three Alternative Models 
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Table 6. Equilibrium Relationship Between Inflation Persistence and Relative Uncertainty 











t i t i i t i persistence t uncertainty t t
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λ δλ δκ α λ β κ ε





∆= ∆ + ∆ − − +





  Model 1 (Kalman Filter)  Model 2 (HP Filter)  Model 3 (Real-time data) 
Trace Test (T-nm) 
0  19.15 [0.00]**  16.61 [0.01]**  5.21 [0.54] 
1  0.45 [0.57]  0.52 [0.54]  0.23 [0.70] 
Test for weak exogeneity of relative uncertainty about monetary policy                                       
(identification of the cointegrating vector) 
bpersistence  1 -- 1  -- 1  --
buncertainty  -1.4116 (0.1570)  -1.2032 (0.1158)  -1.4133  (0.2652) 
a persistence  -0.0657 (0.0161)  -0.0790 (0.0179)  -0.0380  (0.0190) 
a uncertainty  0 -- 0  -- 0  --
Identification Restrictions  
[p-value] 
0.6235 
[0.43]    0.7682 
[0.38]    0.9815 
[0.32] 
Granger Causality Test 
Persistence does not GC 
Uncertainty 
0.4073 
[0.82]    0.5252 
[0.77]    2.0979 
[0.35] 
Uncertainty does not GC 
Persistence 
13.461 
[0.00]*    13.193 
[0.00]**    8.4475 
[0.01]*   - 36 - 
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